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THE PROPOSED CONSTITUTION FOR TEXAS
by
Elizabeth Levatino* and Steve Bickerstafl**

T HE present

Texas Constitution was drafted by a constitutional convenand adopted by the voters in 1876. Beginning in 1887, only
in
1875,
tion
eleven years after the adoption of the then "new" constitution, attempts to call
a constitutional convention for substantial revision of the document have been
undertaken unsuccessfully. Finally, however, the machinery for substantial
revision of the constitution, approved by the voters in 1972 and continued
through the action of the 64th Texas Legislature three years later, will culminate on November 4, 1975, when a revised constitution will be presented
to the voters for the first time since 1876.
One reason given for the continual call for substantial revision has been
the inflexibility of the present constitution. The lack of flexibility is reflected
in the number of amendments which have been proposed and adopted. The
adoption of no less than 220 amendments, over half of which have occurred
in the past twenty-five years, leads one to the conclusion that the constitution
has increasingly been a barrier to state and local government rather than a
workable guideline for meeting the current needs of Texas citizens and demands on Texas government.
The constrictions caused by the constitution as reflected in the amendment
process were demonstrated in a study conducted by Dr. Janice C. May for
It was
the Texas Advisory Commission on Intergovernmental Relations.'
shown that during the period from 1951 to 1972, ninety-eight of 145 amendments submitted to the voters have dealt with government finance. Sixtyeight of these concerned finance on the state level and thirty on the local
level; seventy-two percent passed. Twenty-nine of the state level finance2
amendments have related to the !thirteen constitutionally established funds.
Twelve of the thirty "local level" finance amendments involved taxation.-3
The next largest category of amendments to the Texas Constituition is that
of amendments amending earlier amendments. Eighty-five such proposals
were submitted between 1951 and 1972, of which sixty-three passed. Sixtyfour of these proposed amendments to amendments concerned finance. 4 A
third category encompasses the forty-six amendments which were designed
to overcome limitations on local government.
St. Mary's College; J.D., The University of Texas. Assistant Attorney
*B.A.,
General of Texas.
** B.A., J.D., The University of Texas. Director of the Office of Constitutional
Research; Parliamentarian of the Texas Senate.
1.

J. MAY, AMENDING THE TEXAS CONsTrruTrON:

1951-1972 (1972).

2. See, e.g., TEX. CONST. art. VII, §§ 2 (Perpetual School Fund), 11 (Permanent
University Fund).
3. J. MAY, supra note 1, at 7.

4. Id. at 2. As Dr. May points out, the sheer number of amendments has created

the need for more amendments; that is, "length breeds length."
vision in Texas, in THE TEXAS CONSTr1IUION: PROBLEMS AND
75 (1971).
5. J. MAY, supra note 1, at 2.

May, Constitutional Re-
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Looking briefly at the amendment process from another perspective, the
five most amended constitutional articles are Article III, Legislative Department-sixty-seven proposed, forty-seven adopted; Article XVI, General 'Provisions-twenty-seven proposed, nineteen adopted; Article VIII, Taxation
and Revenue-fifteen proposed, nine adopted; Article IX, Countiesthirteen proposed, twelve adopted; and Article VII, Education-ten proposed, nine adopted. 6 The high number of amendments to the legislative
article reflects another problem with the present constitution-that of organization. Article III contains provisions which relate not only to the legislature
and legislative processes, but also to finance, 7 to special districts and local
government, 8 and, until recently, to retirement systems. 9 The undesirability
of this piecemeal, band-aid treatment for the ills of the Texas Constitution
was one of the major reasons for seeking the commencement of a comprehensive revision process. Such a process was authorized by the voters
through the establishment of the Constitutional Revision Commission in 1973
and the convening of the Texas Legislature as a Constitutional Convention
in 1974.10 The thirty-seven member Constitutional Revision Commission
studied the present constitution and proposals for its revision for a nine-month
period, held nineteen public hearings which were attended by over 4,000
Texas citizens, and finally presented its recommendations for a revised Texas
Constituition to the Texas Legislature on November 3, 1973.11 On January
8, 1974, the 1974 Constitutional Convention, comprised of the state's 150
representatives and thirty-one senators, convened. On July 30, 1974, the
Constitutional Convention dissolved, unable to agree on a proposed constitution for submission to the voters. On January 14, 1975, the 64th Legislature
convened and by April 16, 1975, it had reconsidered the work of the Constitutional Revision Commission and the Constitutional Convention, and passed
Senate Joint Resolution 11, thereby approving for presentation to the voters
of Texas comprehensive proposals for revising the Texas Constitution, and
giving -thevoters the option to accept or reject each proposal.
This Article will consider certain provisions contained in the proposed constitution, tracing their development through the Constitutional Revision Commission, the committee of the Constitutional Convention which considered the
provisions, the Constitutional Convention itself, and finally, as approved by
the 64th Legislature in the form in which they will be presented to the voters
on November 4, 1975. Limitations of time and space prevent analysis of each
section here, so the provisions discussed were chosen as those presenting significant, substantive alterations in the present constitution. However, it must
be pointed out that no section was ignored by the groups involved in the revi6. Id. at 6.
7. TEx. CONST. art. III, §§ 49, 49a, 49-b, 49-c, 49-d, 49-d-1, 49-e, 50, 50a, 50b,
50b-1, 51, 51-a, 51-b, 51-c, 51-d, 65.
8. Id. §§ 48-d, 51g, 52, 52-b, 52d, 52e (adopted in 1967), 52e (adopted in 1968),
53, 55, 62, 63, 64.
9. Id. §§ 48a (1936), 48b (1965), 51-e (1944), 51-f (1944) (all of which were
repealed on April 22, 1975).
10. TEx. CONST. art. XVII, § 2 (adopted Nov. 4, 1972).
11. See Tnx. CONST. REv. COMM'N, A NEw CONsTrtiIoN FOR TEMs: T xT, ExPLANATION, COMMENTARY 59 (1973) [hereinafter cited as CRC: T1mr].
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sion process, even if the section ultimately remained the same. For example,
in the legislative article, a unicameral rather than a bicameral legislature was
considered but rejected by both the Constitutional Revision Commission and
the Committee on the Legislature of the Constitutional Convention. Similarly, the processes for direct legislation by initiative and referendum were
2
rejected by these same bodies as of little real value in the legislative process.1
The most space and discussion has been allocated to article VIII, for it will
have a direct effect on virtually every citizen. Because this article is discussed in more detail than are the others, a slightly different format, stressing
the impact of the provision, has been followed.
I. ARTICLE III-LEGISLATURE
A. Annual and Veto Sessions
Article III, section 7 of the proposed constitution provides that the legislature shall meet every year, with sessions in odd-numbered years not exceeding 140 consecutive days and sessions in even-numbered years not exceeding ninety days. The legislature may call itself into a "veto session" by
petition of three-fifths of the membership of each house. This session would
be solely to reconsider bills or resolutions for passage over a veto executed
by the Governor within ten days of or after, the adjournment of the previous
session.' 3 The present constitution provides in Article III, section 5 that the
legislature meet every two years, and that only the Governor may convene a
special session.
The Constitutional Revision Commission (CRC) recommended that the
legislature be required to meet at least once every two years. 14 In its deliberations, the CRC considered the present practice of a biennial session for
140 days duration. The members also considered a proposition providing
for a 180-day session in odd-numbered years and a sixty-day session in evennumbered years. While it recognized that the present biennial session is insufficient, the CRC was of the opinion that any limitation on the length of
the session would likely cause the traditional log-jam at the session's end and
12. Id. at 77; Tax. CONST. CONVENTION, REPORT OF THE COMM. ON THE LEGISLAruRE 9 (1974) [hereinafter cited as COMM. ON LEGISLATURE]. Constitutional Conven-

tion Committee reports are on file at the Legislative Reference Library, Austin, Texas.
13. S.J. Res. 11, [1975] Tex. Laws A-58, A-61; TEx. CoNsT. art. I, § 7 (proposed)
[hereinafter, proposed constitutional provisions are cited as TEX. CONST. art. -, § (proposed)]:

'(a) The legislature shall convene in regular session each year on a date
prescribed by law. Sessions may not exceed 140 consecutive days in oddnumbered years and 90 consecutive days in even-numbered years.
:(f) The legislature by petition of three-fifths of the membership of
each house may convene in veto session on the first Monday following the

50th day after adjournment solely to reconsider bills or resolutions for
passage over a veto. Bills or resolutions that may be reconsidered are (1)

bills, resolutions, or appropriation items that the governor vetoed within
10 days of adjournment and that the legislature did not reconsider before

adjournment and (2) bills, resolutions, or appropriation items that, by
virtue of action of the governor after adjournment, did not become law.
14. The precise wording of the CRC version states:

"The Legislature shall meet

at least once every two years and at such times and for such duration as provided by
law." CRC: TExT 10.
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hence would be insufficient for legislative needs. Believing that the legislature would meet for only the time needed, the CRC made its recommendation as a means to provide for the flexibility of annual sessions while avoiding
the rush of last-minute bills inherent in a time limitation on sessions. The
CRC pointed out that thirty-three states presently have annual sessions and
of these half have no time limits. 1
The CRC was not unanimous in its recommendation for a very flexible
legislative schedule. In a separate statement, a ten-member minority proposed that the annual sessions be limited to 180 days in odd-numbered years
and sixty days in even-numbered years. The short session was to be limited
to fiscal matters and matters submitted by the Governor and could be extended for thirty days by the Governor.' 6 These members suggested that the
open-ended proposal would not guarantee elimination of the end-of-session
rush. The majority's proposal would provide so much flexibility that the legislature could theoretically meet only once every two years or even year
around. This uncertainty could deter qualified candidates from seeking legislative office. Consequently, these CRC members believed that guidelines as
to frequency and duration of sessions should be contained in the constitution.
No rationale was given for the limitation on the sixty-day session to consid7
eration of fiscal matters only.'
The Committee on the Legislature of the Constitutional Convention rejected the CRC recommendations for some of the same reasons that the
CRC's ten-member minority cited in its separate statement. The Committee
feared that the legislature would be allowed to remain in session too long
without any assurance of increasing the quality of the legislation. The members were also of the opinion that a long session results in legislators losing
touch with their constituents. The Committee rejected the limited biennial
sessions in the present constitution as too restrictive and recommended to
the Convention annual sessions not exceeding 180 days. In this proposal the
Committee members anticipated a recess between the holding of legislative
committee hearings and actual voting to allow return to home districts for
conferring with constituents. Additionally, the Committee recommended
that the legislature be allowed to convene itself on petition of two-thirds of
the membership of each house.' 8
Debate on the floor of the Constitutional Convention on this section included submission of the CRC proposal, which failed, 19 and submission of
variations upon and the particular proposal of the ten CRC members, all of
which also failed. 20 Much of the debate centered on the use of "consecutive"
or "non-consecutive" in relation to a number of days for the session. Nonconsecutive meeting days could allow for recesses, as desired by the Commit15. Id. at 83.
16. TEX. CONST. REV. COMM'N, A NEW CONSTITUTION FOR TEXAS: SEPARATE
STATEMENTS OF COMMISSION MEMBERS 4 (1973) [hereinafter cited as CRC: STAmMENTS].
17. Id. at 5.
18. COMM. ON LEGISLATURE 17.
19. 17 CONVENTION MINUTES, Apr. 5, 1974, at 69 (Minutes of the Constitutional
Convention are on file at the Legislative Reference Library, Austin, Texas).
20. Id. at 12; 16 CONVENTION MINUTES, Apr. 4, 1974, at 150-77.
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tee on the Legislature, but also could result in year-round sessions. The use
of the words "consecutive days" ultimately prevailed. Attempts to limit the
short session in even-numbered years to restricted subjects such as fiscal matters were ultimately defeated. Problems of defining "fiscal" and the belief
that the purpose of annual sessions is to allow the legislature to respond more
effectively to needs and circumstances as they arise combined for -the defeat
of such limitation. 21 The Convention delegates finally compromised on annual sessions, unlimited as to subject matter, but limited in length to 140
consecutive days in odd-numbered years and ninety consecutive days in
even-numbered years. This was carried forward unchanged by the 64th
Legislature.
The ability to call special sessions of the legislature by a petition of its
membership was recognized as necessary in the separate statements of the
CRC members. Their recommendation would have allowed such a session
on petition of two-thirds of the members of each house. 22 The minority
members felt that this provision would allow the legislature to respond to
crisis situations when the Governor failed to act. 23 This concept was carried
forward by the Convention's Committee on the Legislature, which stated as
an additional rationale the necessity for permitting the legislature to complete
action on important matters not finished during a regular session. 24 On the
floor of the Convention, an amendment was adopted allowing for only a veto
session on a petition of a majority of the membership of each house. 25 The
majority was later changed to three-fifths 26 and the provision then remained
unchanged through the action of the 64th Legislature.
B. Legislative Compensation
Article I1, section 6 of the proposed constitution provides for the compensation of members of the legislature. A salary commission recommends the
amount of compensation, and that recommendation sets the maximum figure
which may be voted by the legislature. 27 The present constitution provides
21. See 16 CONVENTION MINUTES, Apr. 4, 1974, at 157-71; 17
MINUTE , Apr. 5, 1974, at 12-109.
22. CRC: STATEMENTS 5.
23. Id. at 6.
24. COMM. ON LEGISLATUpE 18.

25. 17

CONVENTION

CONVENTION

MINUTES, Apr. 5, 1974, at 116.

26. 31 CONVENTION MINUTES, June 20, 1974, at 41-54.
27. TEx. CONST. art. III, § 6 (proposed) reads as follows:
'Section 6. COMPENSATION. (a) Compensation and allowances for

members of the legislature may not exceed the amounts recommended by

the salary commission established by this section. No change in compensation may take effect prior to the first regular session following a statewide general election.
'(b) The salary commission consists of nine members. The governor,
lieutenant governor, speaker of the house of representatives, attorney
general, and Chief Justice of Texas, acting together, appoint the members
of the commission and designate the chairman. Members must be selected
on a non-partisan basis with due regard, to representation of both sexes
and of the ethnic groups and geographical regions of the state. No person
may be appointed who is related by blood or marriage to, or who has or
has had a business association with, an appointing officer. No person may
be appointed who has served a full term on the commission.
'(c) Members serve six-year terms. One-third of the members are appointed every two years. The appointing officers fill vacancies for the

unexpired term.
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in article III, section 24 that members of the legislature receive $600 per
month ($7,200 per year) and $30 per diem during regular and special sessions. Legislative compensation has been the subject of constitutional
amendment in ten proposed amendments, of which four have been adopted.
Nine amendments contained a set dollar figure for compensation or per diem
and one embodied a proposal for a salary commission, which was rejected
in 1970. In April of this year the voters adopted an amendment which increased the annual salary from the $4,800 set in 1960 to $7,200.
The provision of the proposed constitution is almost identical to that
recommended by the CRC; however, the question engendered much debate
and many alternate proposals were considered by the Constitutional Convention. The recommendation of the CRC differs from that of the proposed
constitution only insofar as the makeup of the commission is concerned. The
CRC recommendation provided that the nine-member commission be appointed by the Governor and approved by the senate.2 8 The proposed constitution provides for the appointment by the Governor, Lieutenant Governor,
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Attorney General, and Chief Justice of Texas, acting collegiately. The CRC provided that the commission
recommend rates of compensation not only for the members of the legislature
but also for the judges of the unified judicial system and officers of the executive branch. 20 The CRC specifically rejected permitting members from the
three branches of government to appoint the members of the salary commission who would recommend their salary levels. The CRC felt that by keeping those directly affected by the commission's work out of the member-selection process, it would negate the effects of public opinion which accompany
legislators' attempts to raise their own salaries.8 0
The Committee on the Legislature recommended that the compensation
be set in the constitution at $8,750 annually plus per diem and travel as provided by law and suggested that a separate submission be put to the voters
embodying the recommendations of the Constitutional Revision Commission.1 The Committee had considered and rejected three other alternatives-the CRC recommendation, a statement that the legislature could set
the compensation of its members, and omission from the constitution of any
mention of legislative compensation, thereby allowing the legislature to act
as it wished. The Committee's recommendation was quite simply based on
what its members thought would be most acceptable to the voters in light
of past attempts to raise legislators' salaries. The recommendation of submitting the CRC's salary commission as an alternative proposal was based on
respect for the CRC's belief that it was a viable option.8 2
'(d) No member while serving on the commission may hold any other
public office, be an employee of the state, or hold an office in a political

party.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

'(e) The commission shall review legislative compensation and allowances annually and at that time may recommend changes.
CRC: TEXT 40, 172.
Id.
Id.

COMM. ON LEGISLATURE 16, 27.
16 CONVENTION MINUTES, Apr. 4, 1974, at

2-4.
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All of the Committee's proposals were considered and debated on the floor
of the Constitutional Convention"3 as were others, such as a base salary of
$4,800 with a five-and-one-half percent per year cost of living increase, 4 a
statement that the legislature could not set its salary (thereby allowing the
legislature to establish a commission by. statute), 85 and attempts to change
the dollar figure. 36 None succeeded. Throughout the debate of April 4 and
upon readjournment on May 7 repeated attempts to place the salary commission in the constitution and to provide for the stated dollar salary as an alternate submission were frustrated. On May 8, however, the Committee's recommendation was rejected by a vote of ninety-three to forty-two in -favor
37
of the salary commission.
The controversy over whether legislators should receive an increase in salary has been a continual subject of constitutional amendment. The 64th
Texas Legislature decided that the only realistic way to approach legislative
salaries was to provide for the salary commission and to avoid setting a dollar
figure in the constitution which would require continual amendment through
the years. Approval of a legislative salary increase, it was reasoned, can be
exercised through the ballot since an increase in compensation will not take
effect until the next succeeding general election and may result in a defeat
of those members voting for such an increase.38
II.

ARTICLE IV-ExEcuTvE

A. Governor's Removal of Appointed State Officials
Article IV, section 2, subsection (d) of the proposed constitution provides
that officers appointed by a Governor may be removed by the Governor for
stated reasons. The Governor must submit his reasons to the senate and unless those reasons are rejected by the senate, the officer is removed.3 9 Since
no specific provision regarding removal of appointed officers is in the present
constitution, article XV, section 7 which requires that the legislature provide
40
by law for trial and removal of officers, has controlled.
33. Id. at 10-18, 59-61.
34. Id. at 52-54.
35. Id. at 18-22.
36. Id. at 131-41.
37. 18 CONVENTON MINumS, May 8, 1974. Two other members were present, but
not voting, and forty-three others were not voting.
38. It should be noted that the 64th Legislature adopted the salary commission approach prior to the passage of the salary increase contained in the constitutional amendment of April 23, 1975.
39. TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 2(d) (proposed) reads as follows:
In addition to other procedures provided by law for the removal of appointed officers, officers appointed by a governor with the advice and
consent of the senate and not serving at the pleasure of the governor may
be removed by the governor only for stated reasons. Prior to removal and
not less than 45 days prior to the required adjournment of a regular session or not more than two days after the convening of a special session, the
governor shall advise the senate in writing of the reasons for the proposed
removal. If within 45 days after receipt of the governor's statement of
reasons the senate by majority vote of the membership rejects the governor's proposed removal, the governor may not remove the officer for
those stated reasons.
40. The particular characteristics of such trials have not been constitutionally established. See Tax. CONST. art. XV, § 7.
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Pursuant to other provisions of the present Texas Constitution, members
of boards of state agencies are appointed to terms of two years each or staggered six-year terms. 41 Since gubernatorial terms prior to that commencing
in 1975 were constitutionally limited to two years, 42 two-thirds of the membership of the governing boards of the over 200 agencies were not appointed
by the Governor presently in office. Criticism has often been levied against
this system on the grounds that neither the members of the agencies nor the
Governor are responsive or responsible to the needs of the people as dealt
with by a particular agency. The proposed constitution remedies this in two
ways. First, the length of terms for members of appointed agencies is not
dictated except for those specifically set out in the constitution. 48 Second,
section 2 of article IV allows removal of these appointed officers by the Governor, a power which is not provided for in the present constitution.
In recommending such a proposal, the CRC reasoned that having appointed officers serve at the pleasure of the Governor would justify holding
the Governor accountable for the actions of such appointed members of the
executive branch. 44 The recommendation of the CRC was carried forward by the Committee on the Executive of the Constitutional Convention.
However, to prevent abuse of the removal power, the Committee recommended that a two-thirds vote of the Texas Senate taken within thirty days
after submission of the name of the person to be removed be required to re45
ject that removal.
Floor debate on this provision extended over three days-March 8, 11 and
12. A main concern was the lack of definition of the grounds for removal
and the requirement of "cause" only. It was feared that gubernatorial removal for political or even unknown reasons could occur constitutionally under that language. This fear was resolved on the floor by the addition of a
provision requiring the Governor to provide the senate with a proposal for
removal containing the cause for the action. 46 That resolution was altered
by the Convention's Committee on Style and Drafting to the present authorization of removal for "stated reasons."' 47 The Style-Drafting Committee
eliminated the word "cause" in order to make clear that an officeholder has
48
no redress in the courts.
A second concern was the vote required in the senate to reject the proposed removal. Amendments were offered to lower the required vote to
one-third or to require affirmative action to approve the Governor's proposed
removal. Both of these amendments failed initially. The debate here cen41. id. art. XVI, §§ 30, 30a.
42. Id. art. IV, § 4 (1876) (this section amended on Nov. 7, 1972).
43.

See id. art. III, § 6 (proposed) (salary commission); id. art. IV, § 22 (pro-

posed) (railroad commission).

44. CRC: TEXT 94.
45. TEx. CONST. CONVENTION, REPORT OF THE COMM. ON THE EXECUTIVE 18 (1974)
[hereinafter cited to as COMM. ON ExncurrnE]. Procedures for removal of executive
department members remain the same.
46. See 9 CONVENTION MINUTES, Mar. 8, 1974, at 41-53; id., Mar. 11, 1974, at 6272; id., Mar. 12, 1974, at 1-6.
47. TEX. CONST. CONVENTION, REPORT OF THE COMM. ON STYLE AND DRAFTING,
ARTICLE IV, THE EXECUTIVE 20 (1974).

48. Id.
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tered on whether it should take .the same vote to remove an appointed
officer as it does to confirm him initially. Ultimately, the belief that removal
should not be able to be blocked by only eleven senators prevailed and a
majority vote was required to reject the Governor's proposed removal. 49
A move to have the house of representatives rather than the senate act
in removal proceedings was defeated.5 0 A final change expanding the time
for senate action from thirty to forty-five days was made, 51 but the substance
of the subsection remained unchanged through the actions of the 64th Legislature.
B.

Pre-inauguralAppropriation for the Governor

Article IV, section 4, subsection (b) of the proposed constitution provides
that the legislature appropriate financial assistance to a Governor-elect prior
to his inauguration. 5 2 There is no such comparable provision in the present
constitution. An overriding problem facing each new Governor-elect is that
of familiarizing himself with his office, with his responsibilities, and with state
government in general. In the past, the legislature has come into session on
the second Tuesday in January of odd-numbered years. As a result, one of
the most demanding times during a Governor's term commences within a few
short days of his own inauguration. The Governor's ability to present a budget and to propose and execute his duties as chief executive officer of the
state have been greatly hindered in the past. This was recognized by all
groups involved in the revision process. The CRC recommended this preinaugural appropriation for those very reasons.5" The Committee on the Executive followed the CRC's recommendation but eliminated the CRC's limitation on the use of such funds "for a staff and office space"5 4 so as to allow
more flexibility to the Governor-elect in the use of these funds. 55 The
amount of the appropriation will be determined by the legislature. There
was no floor debate by the Convention on this proposal and the 64th Legislature carried forth the proposal of the CRC as modified by the Committee
on the Executive into the proposed constitution.
C. Budget Execution Powers of the Governor
Article IV, section 15 of the proposed constitution provides that the legislature may authorize or direct the Governor to exercise fiscal control and that

49. 9 CONVENTION MINUrS, Mar. 11, 1974, at 25-60; id., Mar. 12, 1974, at 6368.

50. Id., Mar. 12, 1974, at 32.
51. Id. at 62-68.
52. TEX. CONST. art. IV, § 4(b) (proposed) reads: "The legislature shall provide
an appropriation for assistance to a governor-elect prior to inauguration. A governorelect is entitled to receive any information and reports that the incumbent governor is
entitled to require from officers and state agencies."
53. CRC: TExr 95.
54. Id. at 94.
55. COMM. ON EXECUTIVE 21.
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he must insure that certain appropriations for the executive branch are spent
in accordance with the appropriations. 5 6 As the chief executive officer, the
Governor should have some responsibility for overseeing the efficient operation of state agencies and should have the power to implement his responsibility. Additionally, with the constitutionally limited biennial session, the
legislature itself has been unable to monitor effectively the expenditure of
the funds which it has appropriated. Consequently, the legislature has at
various times attempted to give the Governor certain authority over budget
execution of appropriated money. These attempts have failed because of
57
constitutional impediments.
The CRC recommended that the question be settled by giving the legislature the authority to grant budget execution power to the Governor. The
C.RC did not recommend making this grant directly to the Governor, as it
wished to leave the legislature with the flexibility to spell out the type of budget execution power it felt necessary to grant to the Governor.5"
The Committee on the Executive generally agreed with the CRC but
recommended that certain specific powers be contained in the constitution.
In the version of the Committee on the Executive, the Governor was given
the right and responsibility to insure that items of appropriation for the executive branch be expended as directed by the legislature, with the caveat that
the legislature must determine whether the power extends to items for the
other elected officers of the executive department.5 9 On the floor of the
Convention, after a discussion with the Governor's office, certain technical
changes were made to clarify the intent of the Committee on the Executive. 0
An attempt to remove the automatic exclusion of elected officers of the executive department was defeated. 61 The provision appears unchanged in the
final draft of the proposed constitution by the 64th Legislature except for
rewording by the Style and Drafting Committee6 2 which spelled out the exemption for elected officers.
D. Ten-Year Life of CertainState Agencies
Article IV, section 24 of the proposed constitution provides that certain
statutory state agencies, except institutions related to higher education, will
have a life of not more than ten years unless renewed by law for not more
56. TEx. CONST. art. IV, § 15 (proposed) reads:
'Section 15. BUDGET EXECUTION. (a) The legislature by law
may authorize or direct the governor to exercise fiscal control over the
expenditure of appropriated money.
'(b) The governor shall ensure that items of appropriation for the
executive branch, except items for the other elective offices of the execu-

tive department, are expended only as directed by the legislature. The
legislature by law may remove the exception.
57. See TEx. ATT'Y GEN. Op. Nos. M-1227 (1972), V-1254 (1951); TEX. ATr'y
GEN. LETTER ADVISORY No. 2 (1973).
58. CRC: TExT 101.

59. COMM. ON EXECUTIVE 33-34.
60. 10 CONVENTION MINUTrEs, Mar. 15, 1974, at 38.
61.

Id. at 39.

62. TEx. CONST. CONVENTION, REPORT
ARTICLE IV, THE ExEcuTIVE 40-42 (1974).

OF THE COMM. ON STYLE AND DRAFTING,
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than ten years at a time.68 There is no comparable provision in the present
constitution, and it was not contained in the CRC's recommendations.
The Convention's Committee on the Executive devised section 24 and gave
as its rationale the advantage of periodic review and renewal of statutory
agencies which would give impetus to action on reorganization by the Governor and the legislature. 6 4 It may be surmised that a general feeling existed
to the effect that the proliferation of state agencies is neither required nor
economical. Some of those agencies, possibly effective and necessary at the
time of their creation, no longer serve a real purpose in state government,
and constitutionally required review might bring expenditures for these agencies to an end.
On the floor of the Convention, the Chairman of the Committee on the
Executive cited this section as probably the most significant provision in the
article. 65 Apparently, the delegates agreed, for only one amendment, seeking to strike the ten-year life provision, was offered to this section and that
amendment was defeated by a vote of 108 to forty-nine. 66 The language
of the section proposed by the Committee on the Executive and approved
by the Constitutional Convention was carried forward by the 64th Legislature
with only one significant change. The change provided that consideration
on the floor of the legislature of an agency renewal bill is mandatory only
when the agency would expire in less than two years from the beginning of
the session in which the bill was introduced. The Convention language,
which required floor consideration of all agency renewal bills during the session in which they are introduced, could have resulted in a frustrating delay
in consideration of other bills then pending before the legislature.
III.

ARTICLE V-JuDICIARY

A. Unified JudicialSystem
Article V, section 1, subsection (a) of the proposed constitution establishes
63. TEx. CONsT. art IV, § 24 (proposed) reads:

'Section 24. STATE AGENCIES. (a) State agencies include all
boards, commissions, departments, institutions, and other executive or
administrative agencies of state government. State agencies are a part of
the executive or administrative agencies of state government. State agencies are a part of the executive branch unless otherwise provided by law.
'(b) Statutory state agencies with statewide jurisdiction having appointed officers, except institutions related to higher education, have a life
of not more than 10 years unless renewed by law for not more than 10
years at a time. Unless otherwise provided by law, appointed officers
serving on the effective date of a renewal continue to hold office for the
terms for which they were appointed. A bill to renew -an agency or agencies, the life of any one of which expires in less than two years from the

beginning of the session in which the bill was introduced, must be reported
from committee in the house and senate and brought to a vote in each
house not less than 20 days before adjournment.

'(c) Subsection (b) of this section does not end the life of a state
agency with outstanding bonds unless the legislature by law first provides
for the administration of property under the control of the agency and
makes adequate provision for servicing the outstanding debt to ensure that
the bond obligations are not impaired.
64. COMM. ON EXECUTIVE 41.
65. 9 CONVENTION MINUTES, Mar. 8, 1974, at 5.
66. 10 CONVENTION MINUTES, Mar. 18, 1974, at 36.
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a unified judicial system. 67 -Initially, Texas had such a system, but in 1891
amendments were adopted to relieve the supreme court docket by creating
the intermediate courts of appeal with civil jurisdiction only and by creating
the specialized criminal appeals court. 8 The present constitution also allows
the creation of other courts, resulting in the creation of approximately ten
criminal district courts, six juvenile courts, twenty-six courts of domestic relations, six special probate courts, and sixty-two county courts at law.0 9 These
statutory courts often have overlapped jurisdiction with the constitutional
courts and have "burgeoned into an inefficient and cumbersome arrange70
ment."
The concept of the unified judicial system for this state was proposed at
each level of consideration of this article. The underlying premise of this
type of system is to expedite the fair administration of justice in both the
civil and criminal areas. By providing an intermediate level of appeal for
criminal cases, the CRC anticipated that the existence of more judges to hear
71
these cases would expedite appeals.
The CRC proposal for a unified judicial system remained generally the
same through the Constitutional Convention and the 64th Legislature, with
a few minor differences. The CRC recommended two county judges, one
for the county court and one for the county commission. 72 The effect of
this recommendation would be to remove judicial functions from the administrator of the county commission. The Committee on the Judiciary, however, felt that in the unified judicial system the term "circuit court" should
be substituted for the term "county court" so as to eliminate confusion between judges of county courts and county commissions. 73 Under all proposals, the circuit court (or county court as recommended by the CRC) may
encompass more than one county, so as to assure that rural areas with few
lawyers will have a licensed attorney as judge, and to balance the division
of counties with little litigation.74 For more populous urban centers with a
67. TEx. CONST. art. V, § 1(a) (proposed) reads:
'Section 1.

JUDICIAL POWER.

(a) The judicial power of the state

is vested in the judicial branch. The state unified judicial system is composed of a supreme court, courts of appeals, district courts, and circuit
courts. All courts have jurisdiction as provided by law, but jurisdiction
of courts of the same level within the unified judicial system must be
uniform throughout the state. No courts may be created except those
authorized by this article.
TEx. CONST. art. V, § 6 (proposed) provides that other courts may exist as part of
the judicial branch but not as part of the unified judicial system. Unlike unified judicial system judges, § 6 court judges need not be licensed attorneys and their com-

pensation is not controlled by constitutional provision.

See TEX. CONST. art. V, §§ 8,

17 (proposed).
68. TEx. CONST. CONVENTION, REPORT OF THE COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY 9 (1974)

[hereinafter cited as COMM. ON JUDICIARY].
69. Id. at 11.
70. CRC: TExT 109.
71. The CRC version also provided means for assisting any court overburdened by
its new jurisdiction. See id. at 109, 112-13, 119-20.
72. Id. at 158-59.
73. COMM. ON JUDICIARY 22. County commission judges may have judicial duties
provided by law.
74. Id. at 21-22; CRC: TExT 113.
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greater volume of litigation, both the Committee on the Judiciary
and the
75
CRC proposals allowed for more than one judge per county.
Four members of the CRC disagreed with the composition of the unified
judiciary, preferring elimination of the county or circuit courts and abolition
of the justice and municipal courts. 76 The result would have been a one-tier
trial court system. The reasons cited for this position were criticism of
justice and municipal courts as criminal courts; limited jurisdiction of these
courts which suggested "an hierarchical rank among judges and other personnel"; and "the impression that a lesser quality of justice is administered" from
77
these lower courts.
Debate on the report of the Committee on the Judiciary extended from
May 13 through May 23, and was postponed to June 12 for passage to third
reading. Attempts to preserve the present bifurcated system in various
forms, such as by creating an intermediate tier of criminal appellate courts,
failed. The suggestion of the four members of the CRC to eliminate circuit
78
courts also failed.
Provisions for the creation of the circuit courts were altered by the Convention. The creation of circuit courts, while mandatory in the Committee's recommendation, became permissive as a result of extensive Convention deliberation. 79 The floor debate showed the delegates' concern about requiring the
creation of circuit courts in rural areas where they may not be needed. While
this factor was only briefly alluded to on the floor, evidently a number of
county judges were not in favor of mandatory circuit courts and perhaps this
opinion by those directly concerned influenced the outcome. The cost factor
was also considered, with the result that the provision became permissive and
remained so through the action of the 64th Legislature. The Convention
also provided for continuation of constitutional courts unless otherwise provided by law. Further, until such time as the legislature creates circuit courts,
the offices and jurisdiction of the various statutory county courts are retained. Once the legislature acts, -the judges holding those offices in a county
to be served by a circuit court become judges of the circuit court.80
The municipal courts and justice courts were continued under all the CRC,
Committee on the Judiciary, and Convention proposals but not as part of the
unified judiciary system. To eliminate the past experience of proliferation
of various kinds of courts with specialized jurisdiction, the CRC recommended that the court system be limited to that authorized by article
V. 81 The Committee on the Judiciary eliminated language which would
prohibit -the legislature from creating other courts on a vote of ten-to-nine,
with one not voting.8 2 Nevertheless, the prohibition against the creation of
83
other courts was reinserted by the Convention.
75.
76.
77.
78.

Id.
CRC: STATEMENTS 17-18.
id.

19 CONVENTION MINUTES, May 13, 1974, at

May 16, 1974, at 53-71.

22-57; 21 CONVENTION MINUTES,

79. 21 CONVENTION MINUTES, May 16, 1974, at 73-144.

80. S.J. Res. 11, [1975] Tex. Laws A-78, A-79.
81. CRC: TEXT 109.

82. COMM. ON JUDICIARY 12-13.
83. 32 CONVENTION MINUTES, June 27, 1974, at

25-28.
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Appeal by the State

Article V, section 14 of the proposed constitution grants the state the right
to appeal in criminal cases when the trial court rules a law unconstitutional
or, at the discretion of the supreme court, from a court of appeals decision
to the supreme court. 84 Article V, section 26 of the present constitution prohibits any appeal by the state in criminal cases. The CRC recommended
continuation of the present constitutional provision on the grounds that grant-

ing the right may prove an economic hardship to the defendant and furthermore might be used as an instrument of oppression.8 5 The same provision
and rationale appeared in the report of the Committee on the Judiciary."0
The delegates to the Convention, however, disagreed with the CRC and
the Committee report. Extensive debate occurred on this provision. Proponents of granting the right cited the creation of intermediate criminal appellate courts with the probability that inconsistent rulings would emanate
which would require resolution by the supreme court. Some of the debate
centered around the circumstances under which appeals should be granted.
The following proposals were offered and defeated: (1) a ruling suppressing
evidence or quashing an indictment or information or count thereof; (2) a
ruling granting a new trial; (3) a ruling arresting judgment; (4) the assessment of a sentence on the grounds that it is illegal; (5) on questions of law;
(6) as provided by law.8 7 ,In a complete substitute for article V offered on
June 12, the state's right of appeal was limited to a ruling that a law is unconstitutional and to cases in which there is a conflict between courts of appeals
decisions. 88 This provision, acknowledged as a compromise, ultimately prevailed 8" and remained the same through the action of the 64th Legislature,
despite attempts on the floor of the senate and the house to alter the provision.
IV.

ARTICLE VII-EDUCATION:

EQUITABLE SUPPORT OF FREE PUBLIC SCHOOLS

Article VII, section 1 of the proposed constitution establishes a state policy
and duty to maintain free public schools through high schools which furnish
an equal educational opportunity. Local school districts may provide enrich84. TEx. CONST. art. V, § 14 (proposed) reads:
'Section 14. APPEAL BY STATE. Subject to the guarantees of the
Bill of Rights of this constitution, the state may appeal in a criminal case
only (1) from a trial court ruling that a law is unconstitutional or (2)
from a court of appeals decision to the supreme court, which appeal is at

the discretion of the supreme court unless otherwise provided by law.
85. CRC: TExT 121.
86. COMM. ON JUDICIARY 37-38.

87. 20 CorNVNrION MINUTES, May 15, 1974,
May 16, 1974, at 28-50.
88. 29 CONVENTION MINUTES, June 12, 1974,
89. Id. at 98.

at 153-79; 21 CONVENTION MINUTES,

at

6.
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ment of educational programs. 90 Article VII, section 1 of the present consti-

tution does not mention equal educational opportunity or local enrichment.
Debate over this section stemmed principally from the attempt to comply
with the Supreme Court ruling in San Antonio Independent School District
v. Rodriguez.91 The CRC recommended adding the phrase "equal educational opportunity for each person in the State" as well as a statement that
state support of education shall be based on the wealth of the state as a
whole. 92 The CRC saw the greatest inequities in public school financing as
disparity in local spending per pupil due to the difference in the wealth of
school districts and the failure of the Minimum School Foundation Fund to
compensate for this difference. Though it did not set out a specific formula,
the CRC felt that its suggested language established the basic principles to
guide the legislature in achieving equitable support of public schools. 93
The Committee on Education of the Convention generally followed the
CRC recommendations and reasoning but dropped the language which required the state educational programs to recognize variations in the backgrounds, needs, and abilities of all students. The Committee feared that this
language would lock the legislature into a specific school finance plan.
Finally, the Committee deleted the CRC language which allowed the legislature to make variations in the local tax burden to support other governmental
services into account. The Committee believed that this phrase would result
in penalizing those tax districts which are frugal in their governmental services. The Committee also specifically disclaimed any intent to prohibit local
enrichment by individual school districts.9 4
90. TEx. CONST. art. VII, § 1 (proposed) reads:
'Section 1. EQUITABLE SUPPORT OF FREE PUBLIC SCHOOLS.
A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation of the
liberties and rights of the people, the legislature has the duty to establish
and provide by law for the equitable support and maintenance of an efficient system of free public schools below the college level. The system
must furnish each individual an equal educational opportunity, but a
school district may provide local enrichment of educational programs exceeding the level provided by the state consistent with general law.
91. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
92. The CRC proposed wording was as follows:
'Section 1. EQUITABLE SUPPORT OF FREE PUBLIC SCHOOLS.
'(a) A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation
of the liberties and rights of the people, it shall be the duty of the Legislature to establish and make suitable provision for the equitable support
and maintenance of an efficient system of free public schools and to provide equal educational opportunity for each person in this State.
'(b) In distributing State resources in support of the free public schools,
the Legislature shall ensure that the quality of education made available
shall not be based on wealth other than the wealth of the State as a whole
and that State supported educational programs shall recognize variations
in the backgrounds, needs, and abilities of all students. In distributing
State resources, the Legislature may take into account the variations in
local tax burden to support other local government services.
CRC: TEXT 129.

93. id. at 129-30.
94. The Committee on Education's version was as follows:
'Sec. 1. SUPPORT OF FREE PUBLIC SCHOOLS. A general diffusion of knowledge being essential to the preservation of the liberties and
rights of the people, the legislature shall provide for a system of free
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The specific wording of the introductory paragraph to this section was carefully scrutinized. Committee consideration was given to -the substitution of
"equitable" for "equal educational opportunity." There was some concern that
the latter phrase would require equal dollars and identical programs, but this
belief did not prevail. Further, fear was expressed that the use of the word
"individual" in relation to the requirement of equal educational opportunity
might require the elimination of programs such as continuing adult education.
The Committee concluded, however, that read in context with the requirement of providing schools through the high school level, the use of "individual" would not exclude adult elementary and secondary instruction. 5
This provision generated extensive debate on the floor of the Convention.
Initial discussion lasted for two full days during which time the practical and
legal effects of such phrases as "equitable support," "equal educational opportunity," "wealth," and "quality education" were extensively debated. A
major controversy stemmed over whether local enrichment by school districts
would be allowed or eliminated by implication from the requirement of measuring the wealth of the state as a whole in funding equal educational opportunities. Compromises were sought, but failed until a provision mandating
equal educational opportunity but allowing for local enrichment of educational programs "as provided by general law" was adopted.9 6 The actual
language allowing for local enrichment was grafted onto this section by the
Style and Drafting Committee as a result of a floor amendment to section
5, which governs school and community junior college districts. The Style
and Drafting Committee felt that the concept of local enrichment related to
policy rather than structure and therefore more appropriately should be
placed in section 1.97 On third reading amendments were again offered to
this section but the Report of the Style and Drafting Committee on section
1 was adopted without significant change. 98 Further attempts to alter the
wording of this section in the 64th Legislature were defeated and the section
was carried into the proposed constitution.
V.

ARTICLE VIII-FINANCE

Few parts of the proposed constitution will make changes as potentially
far-reaching as those envisioned by article VIII, the amendment revising the
finance provisions of the constitution. The amendment will drastically reduce the length of the constitution, set the stage for statewide reform of the
property tax, impose new restrictions on the ability of state agencies to create
public schools through the secondary level that will furnish each individual

equal educational opportunity.
'In distributing state support of the free public schools, the legislature
shall ensure that the quality of education made available shall not be based
on wealth other than the wealth of the state as a whole.
TEx. CONST. CONVENTION, REPORT OF THE COMM. ON EDUCATION 13-15 (1974).

95. Id. at 16.
96.

3 CONVENTION MINUTES, Feb. 18, 1974, at 7-128; 4 CONVENTION MINUTES,

Feb. 19, 1974, at 9-117.
97.

TEx.

CONST.

CONVENTION,

REPORT

OF COMM.

ARTICLE VII, EDUCATION 16-18 (1974).
98. 30 CONVENTION MINUTES, June 18, 1974, at 104-200.

ON

STYLE

AND

DRAFTING,
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debt without approval of state voters, and eliminate the need for constitutional amendment to clarify authority to use public funds for public purposes.
If proposed article VIII is adopted, the finance provisions of the constitution, other than those relating to local government authority to tax or to incur
indebtedness, will appear in a single revised article. The article will Provide
the basic structure for state and local property taxation, limitations on state
appropriations and the creation of state debt, standards for the use of public
money and credit, and miscellaneous limitations affecting taxes other than
the ad valorem tax. 'Provisions on these same subjects are scattered haphazardly throughout the present constitution. The new article consists of
thirteen sections totaling 1,886 words, in contrast to the fifty-five sections of
approximately 13,837 words that will be repealed if the amendment is
adopted. 99
A.

Taxation

The state's power to tax is plenary. No constitutional grant of authority
is necessary. Rather than allowing taxation, constitutional provisions limit
the scope or manner of taxation or the distribution of tax revenues. The
present state constitution places few limitations on taxes other than the ad
valorem tax on property. 100 Thus, currently, the legislature possesses virtually complete authority over the levy and structure of taxes such as the sales
tax, inheritance tax, severance tax, etc. The present constitution even specifically authorizes an income tax,' 0 ' although the legislature has never acted
to levy one.
The proposed constitution makes numerous changes to address problems
which have been identified in the last century, but it also preserves a number
of provisions of the present constitution. For example, the present constitution limits the purposes for which motor vehicle registration fees and the revenue from taxes on motor fuels and lubricants may be used. 10 2 This dedication of revenue is carried forward in article VIII, section 7 of the proposed
constitution. Registration fees are divided between use by the counties and
use on state public roadways. Motor fuel tax revenues are divided between
use on state public roadways (three-fourths) and deposit in the Available
School Fund (one-fourth). One new exception to this dedication of tax revenue is made in section 7(b) of the proposed constitution.1 0 3 If a "petroleum
99. S.J. Res. 11, [1975] Tex. Laws A-101 to -105.

100. Among the restrictions placed on other taxes in the present constitution are:
(1) taxes must be levied and collected by general law for public purposes only (TEx.
CONsr. art. VIII, § 3); (2) the power to tax corporations may not be surrendered (id.

§ 4); (3) occupation taxes must 'be equal and uniform upon the same class of subjects
within the limits of the authority levying the tax (id. § 2); (4) occupation taxes may
not be levied on mechanical or agricultural pursuits (id. § 1); (5) occupation taxes may
be levied by political subdivisions only in an amount not to exceed one-half of the tax
levied by the state (id.); and (6) farm products in the hands of the producer and family
supplies for home and farm use are exempt from all taxes unless directed otherwise by
two-thirds vote of both houses of the legislature (id. § 19).
101. Ta~x. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.

102. Id. § 7a.
103. Both the present and proposed constitutions provide similar exceptions to the

dedication for gross production taxes and ad valorem taxes. See TEx. CONST. art. VIII,

§ 7a; id. art. VIII, § 7 (proposed).
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products manufacturing tax" is levied under the proposed constitution, revenue from the tax may be used for purposes other than public roadways and
the school fund. Before and during the Constitutional Convention, bitter
battles were fought over whether to retain the dedication of the motor fuel
tax and whether to dedicate these or other revenues to mass transit. 10 4 Since
the Convention, the controversy has centered on the provision for a "petroleum products manufacturing tax." Those in favor of its inclusion in the constitution argue that because Texas produces and refines more oil than it
consumes, a "petroleum products manufacturing tax" could produce significant state revenue at little expense to Texas taxpayers. 105 Several major oil
companies have expressed opposition to such a tax. The opposition carries
over to the constitutional provision because of concern that mention of the
tax in a newly adopted constitution and elimination of any restrictions on the
use of revenue from the tax may indirectly encourage passage of such a tax
by a future legislature. Three ironies exist in the controversy over the provision for a petroleum products manufacturing tax. First, mention of the tax
is no indication that it will necessarily be enacted. 10 6 Second, it may be
possible to levy a "refinery tax" under the present constitution without dedi10 7
cating the revenues for public roadways and to the Available School Fund.
Third, the provision itself was adopted as a floor amendment during the Constitutional Convention,' 08 and some persons now opposing the provision may
have favored it at the time over one that would have set a ceiling on the
motor fuel tax and would have directed revenues from any increase in the
tax to general revenue. 109
Section 7 of proposed article VIII also continues to dedicate one-fourth
of the net revenue from state occupation taxes to the Available School
Fund."10 Retention of this provision directly resulted in one of the strangest
sections in the proposed charter. Section 13 of article VIII provides that
a refundable assessment voted by marine food or agricultural producers is
"not a tax." This section was added by the 64th Legislature in response to
a Texas Supreme Court decision,' rendered after the Constitutional Convention, which held that such assessments voted by sorghum producers, even
though refundable, were occupation taxes on an agricultural pursuit and
hence were prohibited by the present constitution. 1 2 The assessments would
not have been prohibited under the proposed constitution, but, if occupation
taxes, would have had to have been partially deposited to the Available
104. See

CRC: TEXT

147;

CRC:

REPORT OF THE COMM. ON FINANCE

Reports

Nos. 2, 4, 6 and 7 (1974);

STATEMENTS

33-34; TEx. CONST.

CONVENTION,

COMM. ON FINANCE], Minority
Tax. CONST. CONVENTION, OFFICIAL PROCEEDINGS

[hereinafter cited as

826-62 (Mar. 22, 1974), 939-59 (Mar. 27, 1974) [hereinafter cited as PROCEEDINGS].
105. See PROCEEDINGS 2337-47 (June 25, 1974).
106. Article VIII, § 1 of the present constitution has authorized an income tax since
1876 but no such tax has ever been levied.
107. See TEx. ATT'Y GEN. LETTER ADVISORY No. 100 (1975).
108. PROCEEDINGS 2337-47 (June 25, 1974).
109. The provision was in the form of a separate proposal to be considered at the
same election as the whole constitution. See PROCEEDINGS 959 (Mar. 27, 1974).
110. See TEx.CONST. art. VII, § 3.
111. Conlen Grain & Mercantile, Inc. v. Texas Grain Sorghum Producers Bd., 519
S.W.2d 620 (Tex. 1975).
112. TEx. CONST. art. VIII, § 1.
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School Fund. Section 13 was added to avoid -this possibility by establishing
13
that these refundable assessments are not taxes."
A significant new provision relates to the sales tax, an important source
of state revenue about which the preserit constitution is entirely silent." 4
Section 12 of the proposed charter specifically prohibits a retail sales tax on
(1) agricultural machinery or parts, fertilizer, feed or seeds, (2) prescription
drugs or medicine, or (3) food except food sold by restaurants or comparable
establishments for immediate consumption. Although discussed as early as
the meetings of the 1973 Constitutional Revision Commission, 1 5 the provision limiting the sales tax first appeared in a proposed document during the
last hours of the Constitutional Convention as part of an ill-fated effort to
win sufficient additional votes for successful passage of the final Convention
product." 6 It was considered again during the regular session of the 64th
Legislature and finally added to the proposed constitution. 1 7 Although section 12 may be criticized because it forecloses a possible source of revenue,
it effectively ends the once-heated controversy over whether the retail sales
tax should be extended to food and other items not currently taxed. This
effect has generated some serious opposition to the section from persons who
are concerned that the constitutional exemption of these particular items will
cause future legislatures to look to taxes other than the sales tax, such as
a refinery tax, corporate profits tax, or income tax, to meet new revenue
needs. Except for the provisions discussed above and one prohibiting taxes
from being levied by special or local laws," 8 proposed article VIII is silent
on taxes other than the ad valorem tax.
B.

State Ad Valorem Taxation

The proposed constitution follows the approach taken by the present constitution in prescribing the structure of state and local ad valorem taxation
in complete detail. 119 Beginning in 1978, the present constitution will prohibit state ad valorem taxation for state purposes, 1 20 except for a ten-cent
113. See G.

BRADEN,

CITIZEN'S GUIDE TO THE PROPOSED NEw TEXAS

CONSTITUTION

44-45 (1975).

114. State sales tax revenue amounted to $1,126,000,000 in fiscal year 1974.

RESEARCH

LEAGUE,

TEXAS AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT:

TEXAS
A FINANCIAL HANDBOOK 22

(1975).

115. Mrs. Faye Holub, a member of the CRC, first suggested that a limitation on
the sales tax should be imposed 'by the new constitution. Her suggested limitation would
have been a quantitative one.
116. Const. Convention Submission Res. Nos. 25, 26 (on file at the Legislative Reference Library, Austin, Texas).

117. It should be noted that the general language in proposed § 12 may be broader
than existing statutory exemptions and may necessitate changes therein. See TEx. TAX.-

GEN. ANN. arts. 20.04(L) (1969), (M) (Supp. 1973), (N) (1969).
118. TEX. CONST. art. VIII, § 1 (proposed).
119. Provisions of the present constitution relating to the ad valorem taxation of
property, in descending order according to the number of ad valorem provisions, are:
(1) virtually all of art. VIII, Taxation and Revenue; (2) art. IX, §§ 4-9, 11, 12,--establishing the taxing power of hospital districts and airport authorities; (3) art. XI, §§ 49-relating to the taxing powers of municipal corporations; (4) art. VII, §§ 3, 3-b, 6a, 16(a), 17-relating to taxing for educational purposes; and (5) miscellaneous sections scattered through art. III (e.g., §§ 48-d, 51-b, 54, 55).
120. TEX. CONST. art. VIn, § 1-e.
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per $100 valuation tax levied for certain institutions of higher education. 121
Other state ad valorem taxes have been phased out gradually since 1968 and
only a two-cent tax will be levied in 1976 in addition to the aforementioned
ten-cent one. 122 Article VHI, section 1 of the proposed constitution continues to impose a quantitative limit on state taxes, but makes three significant
changes. First, the limitation applies only to state taxes on real and tangible
personal property, not to state taxes on intangible personal property. Although intangibles, such as cash, stock, bonds, etc., largely escape taxation
today at both the state and local levels, some persons suggest that an ad
valorem tax on intangibles could be successfully administered from the state
level. This possibility resulted in the exclusion of a tax on intangibles from
the limit in section 1. Second, the two-cent tax, scheduled to end before
1977, is continued in the proposed constitution. Third, both the two-cent
tax and the ten-cent tax 1 23 are made reducible by law. 1 24 State ad valorem
taxes levied in the present constitution may be reduced or ended only by constitutional amendment.
C.

Ad Valorem Tax Reform

The provisions of article VIII of the present constitution are largely deyoted to the specifics of the ad valorem tax on property. The key provision
of the present constitution is article VIII, section 1, which requires that taxation be equal and uniform and that all property in the state be taxed in proportion to value. Many of the succeeding sections of article VIII and other
sections elsewhere in the present constitution specifically make exceptions for
certain types or amounts of property. For example, the constitution exempts
from all ad valorem taxes public property used for public purposes 125 and
$250 of household furniture, 1 26 and exempts from state taxes $3,000 of the
value of residential homesteads. 1 27 The constitution also authorizes the exemption of other property, such as certain property used for religious or charitable purposes. 1 28 Together, these provisions define the constitutional tax
base for state and local ad valorem taxes. To comply with the law, a taxing authority should tax all property within that base, and should tax all of
it at the same tax rate and at market value or the same percentage (ratio)
of market value.
When first included in the Texas Constitution in 1845 and subsequently
carried forward in 1876, the basic ad valorem tax provisions of the present
121. Id. art. VII, § 17.
122. Id. art. VIII, § 1-e.

123. Id. art. VII, § 9 (proposed), the education article, continues the ten-cent tax.
124. In art. VII, § 9 of the proposed constitution the tax is made "changeable" by
law. But the intended effect of both art. VIII, § I and art. VII, § 9 of the proposed

constitution is to permit the legislature to reduce or increase the taxes within the tencent and two-cent limits. The use of the term "changeable" in art. VII, § 9 as compared to "reducible" in art. VIII, § 1 occurred because art. VII, § 9 was amended by
the 64th Legislature.
125. TEx. CONsT. art. XI, § 9.
126. Id. art. VIII, § 1.

127. Id. § 1-b.
128. Id. § 2.
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constitution were intended to assure an equitable tax system by which each
person paid according to his wealth. 129 Instead, at least over the past
century, the provisions have contributed to the development of a property
tax system -that is not only confused but also inequitable. Much has
been written recently on the problems of the existing system, 3 0 but in summary it may be said that the constitutional mandate and the numerous laws

in existence to implement the constitutional requirements are generally ignored. Instead, solutions to practical and political problems are sought at
the local level through extra-legal classifications and exemptions of property.
Many tax offices try to administer fairly a system that repeatedly has been
labeled "unadministrable," but interjurisdictional and intrajurisdictional disparities in property valuation and assessment ratios have become the rule
rather than the exception in Texas. The individual taxpayer is often unaware and unable to determine if he is being treated fairly. Because of the
gap between constitutional principles and local taxing practice, inconsistencies
in legal doctrine also are commonplace, and the individual taxpayer has been

handicapped in effectively challenging violations of the property tax laws.13 '
The ad valorem tax provisions of the proposed constitution are written to

provide the basis for reform of the tax in Texas. They must be read together
to understand properly their separate but dependent purposes. Specifically,
the proposed constitution is intended: (1) to change the constitutional tax
base so as to make the ad valorem tax administrable; (2) to require that
the legislature establish and enforce uniform standards and procedures for
the appraisal of property; (3) to provide the basis for an efficient and manageable local system of property appraisal; and (4) to allow the individual
129.

See W.

NEWHOUSE, CONSTITUTIONAL UNIFORMITY AND EQUALITY IN STATE TAX-

ATION (1959).

130. Much information was available to the committees of the Constitutional Revision Commission and Constitutional Convention concerning the practical and legal aspects of the property tax in Texas. The Finance Committee of the Constitutional Convention placed particular emphasis on the testimony of several persons recognized by the
Committee as authorities on the subject of ad valorem taxation. The persons first appeared among numerous other witnesses, then were asked to review and comment on
the tentative recommendations of the Committee, and finally were invited back to serve
as panelists to discuss the decisions of the Committee. See PROCEEDINGS 741 (Mar. 20,
1974). The Committee also relied in part on the conclusions of the Constitutional Revision Commission. See CRC: TEXT 141-46. A record of the materials utilized by
the Finance Committee of the CRC may 'be found in a three-volume collection of materials entitled RESOURCE DOCUMENT: CONSTITUTIONAL REVISION COMMISSION COMMITTEE ON STATE FINANCES, which may be found in the Legislative Reference Library,
Austin, Texas.
With regard to the property tax in Texas, specific written sources relied on by the
Commission or Convention committees included: C. BARTLETT, PROPERTY TAXES IN
TEXAS SCHOOL DISTRICTS; A STUDY FOR THE GOVERNOR'S COMMITTEE ON PUBLIC
SCHOOL

EDUCATION

(1969);

REPORT

OF THE GOVERNOR'S

COMMITTEE

ON

PUBLIC

SCHOOL EDUCATION (1969); TEXAS ADVISORY COMMISSION ON INTERGOVERNMENTAL RELATIONS, THE TEXAS PROPERTY TAX; BACKGROUND FOR REVISION (1973); TEXAS COMMITTEE ON STATE AND LOCAL TAX POLICY, AN ANALYSIS OF THE PROPERTY TAX LAws
OF TEXAS (1962); TEXAS COMMITTEE ON STATE AND LOCAL TAX POLICY, PROPERTY

TAX ASSESSING IN TEXAS (1967); TEXAS PROPERTY TAX ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH
SEMINAR, SUMMARY OF RECOMMENDATIONS (1973); Anderson, ConstitutionalAspects of

Revenue and Taxation in Texas, 35 TEXAS L. REV. 1011 (1957); Yudof, The Property
Tax in Texas Under State and Federal Law, 51 TEXAS L. REv. 885 (1973); Comment,
Equality in Taxation-Houston's Constitutional Dilemma, 10 Hous. L. REv. 656
(1973).
131. See Yudof, supra note 130.
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taxpayer to seek relief in court for unfairly or illegally levied ad valorem
taxes. With the major exception of the change in the constitutional tax base,
all of these objectives could have been accomplished under the proposed constitution without specific mention in that document. The decision to include
the provisions may be attributed to the feeling of at least some of the delegates to the Constitutional Convention that no real reform of the ad valorem
tax would be forthcoming in the near future unless mandated by the new
constitution. Some of these delegates were concerned that unless Texas
undertook prompt revision of its own system, Congress or the federal courts
132
would become involved.
By requiring that all property be taxed in an equal and uniform manner,
the present constitution prescribes a tax base that has proven impossible to
administer. 183 The experience in Texas, like in other states, has been that
not all property is readily locatable. Nor is all property sufficiently alike to
fairly or effectively allow treatment at the same tax rate or ratio of market
value. The proposed constitution addresses this problem by exempting certain property and by providing new flexibility with regard to other property.
Two examples are (1) household goods and personal effects, and (2) intangible personal property, such as is evidenced by stocks, bonds, cash, etc.
The present Texas Constitution exempts household furniture in the amount
of $250.18 4 All other household furniture and all personal effects are supposed to be located, appraised, and taxed. Obviously all are not. Instead,
some tax assessors add amounts to the value of residential real property to
reflect personal property that has not been seen or appraised but is anticipated to be present in the house. These additions are arbitrary and are often
made without the knowledge of the property owner. As late as 1968, one
school district tax officer acknowledged that a flat $300 was assessed in his
district to each black resident for personal property ownership. 35 On the
theory that household goods and personal effects not used for the production
of income may not be properly located and appraised, article VIII, sections
4(a)(4) and (5) of the proposed constitution simply exempt them from all
ad valorem taxation. It is important to note that members of the Constitutional Convention determined that the category of "personal effects" does not
include automobiles, boats, or other personal property not intimately related
136
to the taxpayer.
Estimates of intangible wealth in Texas are as high as $150 billion, but
virtually all of it has escaped ad valorem taxation because it is highly mobile,
easily concealed, and subject to manipulation. Also, a tax levied on certain
intangibles at the same rate and ratio as that levied on other property in
Texas could be confiscatory or could cause the intangibles to be moved outside the state.' 3 7 Other states have addressed this problem by treating at
least some intangibles in a manner different from other property, such as by
132.
133.
134.
135.
136.
137.

See Weissinger v. Boswell, 330 F. Supp. 615 (M.D. Ala. 1971).
CRC: TEXT 141-44.
TEx. CONsT. art. VIII, § 1.
See C. B raRTL
r, supra note 130, at 10.
See COMM. ON FINANCE 22.
See PRocEEulNas 748-49 (Mar. 20, 1974).
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exempting them from the general ad valorem tax and substituting an in-lieu
or low millage tax. This alternative is not possible under the present Texas
Constitution. The proposed constitution is silent with regard to the taxation
of intangibles.3 8s This change allows the legislature to treat intangibles in
any reasonable manner, perhaps by taxing some on an ad valorem basis,
others in a different manner, and others not at all. Passage of the proposed
constitution would not automatically remove intangibles from the tax base.
Until and unless a law is passed changing the existing system, intangible property would remain part of the ad valorem tax base by virtue of existing statutory law. 139
Article VIII, section 2(b) of the proposed constitution requires that the
legislature by general law provide for the establishment and enforcement of
standards and procedures for appraisal of property for ad valorem tax purposes. Once established, these standards and procedures must be applied
uniformly throughout the state. It is important to note that the duty in 2(b)
extends only to "appraisals"-the method for determining the value of property-and not to assessment ratios, assessed values, or tax rates, which are
also factors in determining the final tax levy. The following example will
indicate the differences. A residence with a market value of $30,000 located
in a city using an assessment ratio of forty percent for residential property
and a tax rate of $1.75 per $100 of valuation would yield a tax as follows:
Appraised value of the property
Assessment ratio
Assessed value
Tax rate
Tax levy

$30,000
x
.40
$12,000
x .0175
$210

All of these factors currently vary between taxing jurisdictions and even between classes of property within the same jurisdiction. But the requirement
in section 2(b) for state action and for uniformity throughout the state is
only applicable to the manner of determining the appraisedvalue of property.
Under both section 2(a), which requires that all real and tangible personal
property be taxed equally and uniformly in proportion to market value, and
section 2(b), assessment ratios and tax rates legally could continue to vary
between taxing jurisdictions. 40 However, section 2(a) would require that
the same tax rate and assessment ratio be applied to all taxable real and
tangible personal property within a taxing jurisdiction. This same requirement now exists under article VIII, section 1 of the present constitution, but
is largely unenforced.
Currently in Texas there are more than 3,000 separate tax offices.
Theoretically each has an independent duty to appraise and assess property.
138. The "silence" occurs because art. VIII, § I of the proposed constitution requires
only that all real and tangible personal property be taxed.

139. See, e.g., Tax. Rv. Civ. STAT.
7162, 7175 (1960).
140. COMM. ON FiNARcB 13-14.

ANN.

arts. 7145, 7147 (1960), 7147a (1970),
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Some make no effort to appraise or assess property, choosing to depend on
valuations determined by other taxing jurisdictions. However, enough taxing
jurisdictions maintain their own value figures so that the individual taxpayer
often finds the same property valued differently on several tax rolls. Article
VIII, section 2(c) of the proposed constitution requires that each county provide for the appraisal of all taxable property within its boundaries in the
manner provided by law. Each taxing authority imposing a tax on property
within the county must tax in proportion to that appraisal. The cost of the
appraisal would be allocated among the taxing authorities.
Obviously section 2(c) was intended to eliminate multiple appraisals and
to provide a single market value figure for the use of taxpayers and all taxing
authorities. Several particular aspects of 2(c) as established by the record
during the Constitutional Convention or 64th Legislature should nevertheless
be noted. First, -the term "the county shall provide for appraisal .
in the
manner prescribed by law" not only permits contracts between taxing authorities or with private companies to determine who will actually appraise a particular piece of property, 141 but also permits the creation of a board or other
unit of county-wide government to administer the appraisal process or to
equalize property valuations. 1 42 Second, the appraisal in 2(c) must be made
in conformance with the standards and procedures established by law under
section 2(b). Third, each taxing authority remains free to establish its own
assessment ratio and tax rate, thus continuing to control its own tax revenues.
Each taxing authority also is granted the right under section 2(b) to seek
countywide enforcement of the standards and procedures of appraisal if such
becomes necessary because of the failure of those responsible for administering the appraisal function.
Together, sections 2(b) and (c) are intended to bring about property tax
reform through a division of responsibilities between the state and local governments. Under section 2(b) the state establishes the standards and procedures of appraisal and, in conjunction with other taxing authorities, sees
that they are properly enforced. Under section 2(c), the actual appraising
of property remains a local function and local governments are assured control over the amount of their own tax revenues. This division reflects four
conclusions by delegates to the Constitutional Convention: first, that property tax reform is impossible without guidance and enforcement from the
state level; second, that the actual appraisal function should remain at the
local level; third, that individual political subdivisions should retain control
over revenues from the property tax through control of their own assessment
ratios and tax rates; and fourth, that uniformity in appraisals is the most essential element in property tax reform and one which has an importance and
utility beyond the ad valorem tax itself. Once the value of a particular piece
of property has been accurately determined and is made known to the property owner, that person may easily determine the assessment ratios being ap141. Id. at 16. See generally PROCEEDINGS 747-78 (Mar. 20, 1974).

142. See COMM.

ON FINANCE

13.

But see

PROCEEDINGS

768 (Mar. 20, 1974). The

issue was finally resolved during the 64th Legislature when art. VIII, § 2(c) of the proposed constitution was amended to add the words "in the manner prescribed by law."
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plied by various taxing authorities and compare effective tax rates. If adequate publication of market and assessed values occur, unequal assessment
ratios and extra-legal classifications of property become apparent and subject
to correction. In other areas, such as the funding of public education, the
market value figures should be useable in determining the equitable distribution of state funds. Sections 2(b) and (c) are intended to permit this result
without interfering with the ability of local governments to tax to meet their
own revenue needs.
Section 6 of article VIII of the proposed constitution is the last of the provisions intended to bring about property tax reform in Texas. 143 The section is one of the most unique and potentially far-reaching of any in the proposed document. The section directly grants each owner of property the
right to pay ad valorem taxes under protest and to sue in district court for
a refund. The section also imposes a duty on the district court to enter those
orders necessary to ensure equal treatment for the complaining taxpayer, including a refund of taxes and equalization of property appraisals and assessments. Additionally, subject to limitation by law, the court is under a duty
to ensure equal treatment under the law for all property owners within the
taxing authority. No similar provision exists in the present constitution or
Texas statutes. There exist at least three purposes for the new section.
Most apparent is that the section grants a new legal remedy to aggrieved ad
valorem taxpayers who, according to several recent studies, 1 4 4 are virtually
unable to obtain effective relief under present law. A related purpose is that
the manner for obtaining relief under section 6 is intended to cause the least
possible interference with the revenue gathering activities of a taxing authority that generally has an equitable tax system. The complaining taxpayer
must pay his tax before entering the courts. Also, the new scheme avoids
the problems arising under current law in which a taxpayer is required to
enjoin the collection of all taxes by the taxing authority to find a solution
to his own assessment or tax. The third purpose is to assure that the reforms
envisioned by sections 2(b) and (c) of article VIII occur. A taxing authority that does not abide by state law or that maintains a generally inequitable
tax system would be vulnerable. Not only could any individual taxpayer obtain a refund, but the court would be required to order equalization of property appraisals or assessments throughout the taxing authority if necessary to
assure equal treatment for all property owners. This duty, which makes the
action under section 6 somewhat analogous to a public rather than a private
action, will not be imposed until after January 1, 1979,' 4 5 and will be subject
to limitation by law.
Most apparent of the arguments of those opposed to property tax reform
is that the establishment and enforcement of uniform standards and procedures for appraisal will result in higher property valuation and thus in
143. This provision originated with the 1969 Constitutional Revision Commission.

CRC REPORT 112-14 (1969).
144. See Yudof, supra note 130; TEx. COMM. ON STATE AND LOCAL TAX POLICY,
supra note 130, at 27-30.
145. S.J. Res. 11, [1975] Tex. Laws A-91 (transition schedule § 3).
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higher local ad valorem taxes. This same argument has been made concerning proposed article VIII. 14 Four observations are in order. First, the argument is not directly applicable to the proposed constitution, but rather to
the particular legislation effecting property tax reform, whether passed under
the present or proposed charter. The specifics of appraisal procedures and
the use of market value figures will be determined by legislation, not by the
election of November 4, 1975. Second, higher valuations, even if they occur
because of more uniformly applied or effective appraisal procedures, do not
necessarily mean an increase in the total dollar amount of property taxes.
The actual effective rate of the tax may be controlled, as it is today, through
the adjustment of tax rates or assessment ratios. If necessary, implementing
legislation providing new standards and procedures may address the use of
new values and proscribe increased taxes.147 Responsible implementation of
article VIII may avoid unnecessary tax increases. The third observation is
that the intended effect of property tax reform is not to increase taxes generally, but to equalize the burden among those paying taxes. Some persons
who currently pay their taxes without protest, scarcely aware of whether they
are being treated fairly or not in relation to other taxpayers, may be surprised
to find that their taxes are actually reduced once accurate appraisal figures
are available. 148 A fourth, and related observation, is that the failure to have
appraisals uniform statewide will not affect whether future taxes may increase
because of new property valuations. Most property is not undervalued on
tax rolls. A taxing authority may selectively increase the value of property
within its jurisdiction without concern that the result will invalidate its tax
roles or be challengeable by the affected property owner. Such spot changes
in values are less visible than decisions to increase tax rates or assessment
ratios. Not only may the affected property owner be unaware of the increase
but he may, at least temporarily, be paying taxes at a higher effective rate
than those whose property continues to be undervalued. -If article VIII's requirement for uniform standards and procedures of appraisal results in more
frequent and comprehensive reappraisals, periods of unequal taxation due to
spot reappraisals may be shortened and the decisions of appraisal made less
political and more visible to the taxpayers.
D. Appraisalof Land Devoted to Agricultural Purposesor
Timber Production
Because both the present and proposed constitutions require that real property be taxed uniformly in proportion to value, any exceptions to that policy
146. COMPTROLLER OF PUBLIC AccouNTs, FISCAL IMPLICATIONS OF THE PROPOSED
TEXAS CONSTITUTION, item 5 under Article VIII (May 23, 1975) (pages unnumbered).

147. See, e.g., H.R. No. 1463, 64th Tex. Legis., Reg. Sess. (1975), which would have
provided for a centralization of the appraisal function if it had passed, required that the
tax rate and assessment ratio which "would impose the same total dollar amount of property taxes as were imposed in the previous year" must be reported, making the decision
to increase taxes a conscious and publicly recognizable one. Other, more restrictive
provisions are possible if necessary.
148. Although actual beneficiaries of such figures likely will vary between taxing authorities, more than one study has indicated that residential property is consistently
among that taxed at the highest ratio to true market value, thus also among that most
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must be provided by the constitution itself. The use of an assessment ratio
different from one used for other property or a valuation of land on the basis
of productivity rather than comparable sales is considered an exception to
the constitutional requirement of uniformity.' 49 Article VIII, section 1-d of
the present constitution directly grants a right of appraisal on the basis of
productivity for land owned by natural persons and designated for agricultural use, but only if agriculture is the "primary occupation and source of income of the owner." Under section 3(a) of the proposed constitution the
legislature is required to provide separate appraisal formulas for open-space
land devoted to farm or ranch purposes and may provide such formulas for
forest land devoted to timber production.' 5 0 The transition schedule of the
proposed constitution carries forward article VIII, section 1-d of the present
constitution as a statute, thus implementing section 3(a) of the new constitution at least with regard to farm and ranch land. The 64th Legislature enacted a new and more far-reaching program of separate formulas for both
farm and ranchland, and timberland. 151
Section 3(a) places an important responsibility on future legislators. The
problem it addresses is a very real one. Approximately thirty-five states
have constitutional provisions or laws providing some ad valorem tax relief
to owners of ranch, farm, or timberland who otherwise would face higher
taxes resulting from land values inflated by nearby urban or resort growth.
Without such relief, agricultural or timber production from the land may be
insufficient to meet -the additional tax burden and the owner may be forced
to sell the land or convert it to more intensive uses. However, there is a
narrow line separating bona fide farmers, ranchers, or timber owners who
need such relief from land speculators or large businesses who have
purchased the land because of its probable increase in value or who are not
likely to be compelled to convert -the land merely because of higher taxes.
The issue is whether this line between deserving and undeserving landowners
should be set in the constitution or by law. Section 3(a) reflects the view
that it should be set by law. To assure that the legislature has complete authority to make classifications as necessary to prevent abuse of the appraisal
policy, section 3(a) specifically authorizes limitations and sanctions to be imposed by general law. Examples of possible limitations are excluding land
owned by corporations, requiring the land to be the owner's residence, or requiring that the land have been in the owner's possession for a number of
likely to benefit from uniform appraisals. The most recent such study is TEXAS LEGisLATIVE PROPERTY TAX COMM., MARKET VALUE STUDY PILOT PROJECT, PHASE II, SUM-

MARY REPORT 68-70 (1975).

149. Letter from Attorney General John L. Hill to Beeman Fisher, Chairman, Fi-

nance Comm.,

CRC, July 20, 1973.
TEx. CONST. art. VIII, § 3 (proposed) provides in part:
'Section 3. AD VALOREM TAX EXCEPTIONS. (a) The legislature by general law shall establish separate formulas for appraising land to
promote the preservation of open-space land devoted to farm or ranch purposes and by general law may establish separate formulas for appraising
land to promote the preservation of forest land devoted to timber production. The legislature by general law may provide limitations and impose
sanctions in furtherance of the appraisal policy of this subsection.
151. H.B. 1535, [1975J Tex. Laws 2374.
150.
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years. 1 5 2 Some states impose long-term restrictions on the use of the land,
preventing conversion without state or local government approval. Section
3(a) makes all of these and other alternatives available. The legislature
must effectively utilize such authority or the appraisal formulas provided under section 3(a) will not serve the purpose for which they were intended.
E. Ad Valorem Tax Exemptions
Because the present and proposed constitutions require that certain
property be taxed, any legal exemption of such property must occur because
of an express grant in the constitution itself. Both constitutions contain such
grants. Some are direct, requiring no action by the legislature or local government; others are merely authorizations for an exemption, requiring further
action before the exemption is actually available. As discussed previously,
the major difference between the two constitutions is that the present one
requires that all property be taxed, whereas the proposed constitution requires only that all real and tangible personal property be taxed.
Generally, the ad valorem tax exemptions provided in section 4 of the proposed constitution are the same as or similar to ones available under the present constitution.' 53 The most significant change is the increased direct exemption of household furniture and personal effects from a total amount of
$250 of such property to the exemption of all such property not used for the
production of income. As discussed previously, this change was made to conform the constitutional tax base to current assessment practice and to permit
better administration of the tax. Other changes in the exemptions include:
(1) new authority by law to increase the ,residential homestead exemption
from state taxes to an amount above the present $3,000 limit; 1 54 (2) conversion of the permissive residential homestead exemption of at least $3,000 for
persons sixty-five and older that appears in the present constitution to a
mandatory one, with authority in the political subdivision to increase the exemption; 155 and (3) new authority to exempt property owned by a nonprofit
water corporation if the property is not held for profit and is reasonably necessary for and is used in the acquisition, storage, transportation, or distribution of water or in providing sewage or waste water treatment service.' 56
One important aspect of article VIII, section 4(d) is that the authority
to grant exemptions is prefaced with the express authority to provide limitations, classifications, or exclusions within the prescribed exemptions. Currently, legislation granting exemptions usually tracks the appropriate constitu57
tional provision, leading to broad and occasionally ill-defined exemptions.
The authority of the legislature to do otherwise under the present constitution
has been questioned and certain proposed statutory exemptions have been
152. See

U.S.

DEP'T OF AGRICULTURE, STATE PROGRAMS

ASSESSMENT OF FARM AND OPEN SPACE LAND

FOR THE DIFFERENTIAL

(1974).

153. See generally TEx. CONST. art. VIII, § 2.
154. Id. art. VIII, § 4(b) (proposed).
155. Id. § 4(c).
156. Id. § 4(d)(7).
157. See generally TEx. REv. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 7150 (Supp. 1974).
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declared invalid because they varied from the constitutional provision.' 58
Section 4(d) affords to future legislatures the opportunity to more effectively
control statutory exemptions.
Section 5 of proposed article VIII grants new authority to provide ad
valorem tax relief to persons determined to be in need of relief because of
economic circumstance and either age or disability, and to preserve cultural,
historical, or natural history resources. Both provisions distinguish between
state and local taxes. Any law granting relief to persons determined to be
in need must either provide for reimbursement of the political subdivision's
revenue loss or provide that the relief is contingent on approval of the political subdivision. Similarly, the legislature may directly grant relief from state
taxes by designating property as a cultural, historical, or natural history resource, but may not make the relief applicable to local taxes unless the property is designated by the affected political subdivision in the manner prescribed by general law.
The approach toward ad valorem tax exemptions in the proposed constitution is to emphasize legislative control. The legislature is granted the authority to effectively manage statutory exemptions as part of a reformed ad
valorem tax system. This authority carries with it a duty for responsible
management that is much the same as that now faced with regard to other
taxes.
F. State Debt
A reader of -the present constitution is greeted with the 'assurance that
Texas cannot incur debt except for defense or in amounts of up to $200,000
for casual deficiencies in revenue. Article III, section 49 provides that "[n]o
debt shall be created by or on behalf of the State, except to supply casual
deficiencies of revenue, repel invasion, suppress insurrection, defend the State
in war, or pay existing debt; and the debt created to supply deficiencies in
the revenue, shall never exceed in the aggregate at any one time two hundred
thousand dollars." Despite this apparently clear and absolute prohibition of
significant state borrowing, the State of Texas and its agencies, by August
1973, had accumulated over two billion dollars in outstanding debt.
The apparent exceptions in section 49 to the debt prohibition-to repel
invasion, suppress insurrection, etc., understandably have not proven to be
of great fiscal significance. The significant exceptions have come from
amendment to the constitution and the judicial demise of the prohibition itself. Although the drafters of the 1876 constitution may well have meant
the term "debt" to have an inclusive meaning, the courts of Texas have narrowly construed the constitutional limitation to apply only to borrowing which
"obligates the credit of the state" and not to bonds issued by an agency of
1 59
the state and payable solely from the non-tax revenues of the agency.
158. See TEX. ATT'Y GEN. Op. No. H-88 (1973).

159. CRC: TEXT 149-50, citing Texas Turnpike Authority v. Shepperd, 279 S.W.2d
302 (Tex. 1955); Texas Nat'l Guard Armory Bd. v. McCraw, 132 Tex. 613, 126 S.W.2d

627 (1939); Charles Scribner's Sons v. Marrs, 114 Tex. 11, 262 S.W. 722 (1924).
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Under the present constitution, bonds obligating the credit of the state are
authorized by constitutional amendment." 0" Currently, specific authorizations exist for $1,360,000,000 in debt, over $760 million of which has been
issued. 16 1 In addition, amendments to article VII, the education article of
the present constitution, have authorized certain senior colleges and universities to issue bonds and notes to finance permanent improvements. 16 2 A
second method of borrowing has been through bonds issued by state agencies,
including senior colleges, on the basis of statutory rather than constitutional
authority.1 68 These "revenue bonds" are not considered "state debt" within
the prohibition of article III, section 49 because repayment is limited to the
non-tax revenue of the issuing agency or institution. Examples include bonds
payable from college dormitory housing rentals, college building-use fees,
traffic facility tolls, or electrical or water service charges.
Article VIII, section 81M of the proposed constitution preserves the requirement that evidences of indebtedness "secured by the general credit of
160. The result has been the addition of sections totaling approximately 6,000 words.
See TEx. CONST. art. III, §§ 49-b, 49-c, 49-d, 49-d-1, 49-e, 50b, 50b-1.
161. On May 31, 1974, the breakdown was as follows:
Oustanding
5-31-74
Issued
Authorized
(Thousands) (Thousands) (Thousands)
Article 1II, §§ 49-c, 49-d,
49-d-1
$144,005
$400,000
$165,100
Water Development Bonds
33,000
100,000
35,000
Water Quality Enhancement

Article I, §§ 49b,

Veterans' Land Board
Article Il, § 49-e,
State Park Bonds

Article I,

$500,000

$200,100

$177,005

$500,000

$400,000

$328,678

$ 75,000

$ 15,750

$ 14,900

$285,000
$1,360,000

$145,500
$761,350

$137,145
$657,728

§ 50b, 50b-1,

Coordinating Board
Loan Bonds
Totals

Two joint resolutions were passed in the 64th Legislature to increase the amount authorized for water development by an additional $400 million and water quality by an
additional $100 million. They will be submitted at the general election in 1976, either
as the first bond authorizations to be voted on under article VIII, section 8 of the proposed constitution if such is adopted, or as amendments to the present constitution.
162. TEx. CONST. art. VIH, §§ 17, 18.
163. See, e.g., TEx. EDuc. CODE ANN. § 55 (1971).
164. Tax. CONsT. art. VIII, § 8 (proposed) reads:
'Section 8. STATE DEBT. (a) State Debt may not be incurred except as authorized by this constitution.
'(b) 'State debt' means bonds or other evidences of indebtedness that
are secured by the general credit of the state or are to be repaid from
taxes, fees, tuition, or other charges of the state, a state senior college or
university, or a state agency or institution having statewide jurisdiction.
'State debt' does not include bonds or other evidences of indebtedness
issued to finance a project if the debt is authorized by law and is payable
solely from revenues generated by the project to be financed.
'(c) State debt may be authorized 'by law if approved by a record affirmative two-thirds vote of the membership of each house of the legislature and submitted to and approved by a majority of the qualified voters

of the state voting on the question.

'(d) State debt may be authorized by law to refund outstanding state

debt.
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the state" must be approved by the record affirmative vote of two-thirds of
the membership of each house of the legislature and by a majority of the
qualified voters of the state voting on the question. This is the same requirement as currently exists for amendments to the constitution, but under section
8, the debt approvals would not become part of the constitution. A similar
process is currently used in California. 16 5
Section 8 extends the required debt approval process to include all bonds
or other evidences of indebtedness "to be repaid from taxes, fees, tuition, or
other charges of the state, a state senior college or university, or a state
agency or institution having statewide jurisdiction." Under the proposed constitution, such bonds or evidences of indebtedness may be issued only after
approval by the vote of two-thirds of the membership of each house and by
the voters of the state. This new requirement reflects the concern of both
the members of the Constitutional Revision Commission and the Constitutional Convention over the rapid rise in the amount of debt created by state
agencies under the present constitution without a vote of the electorate of
the state.' 66 Without including bonds issued by quasi-state agencies (e.g.,
multi-county river authorities) the amount of outstanding state agency debt
created without constitutional amendment rose from approximately $200 million in 1963 to over $900 million in 1973.167 Much of this debt consists
of bonds issued by various colleges and universities and payable from general
building use fees or tuition. Because such bonds could not be issued under
conthe proposed constitution without voter approval, opposition during the
68
universities.1
and
colleges
by
led
was
restriction
debt
new
the
vention to
The decision to limit authority to issue state agency bonds without voter
approval resulted from several conclusions. First, the use of bonds which
depend for repayment on special funds or fees has occurred in large part to
circumvent the need for constitutional amendment to authorize other borrowing. Second, although agency bonds are technically payable only from local
agency revenues, they indirectly constitute a drain on state tax revenue which
must be appropriated to the agency to replace local revenues obligated for
debt service. Third, although the state legally may not be obligated on the
agency bonds, it is unlikely that the state could allow such debt to be forfeited and probably would find some way, directly or indirectly, to assure
that the debt is repaid. Finally, borrowing through special fee or revenue
bonds is significantly more costly than borrowing through bonds directly
backed by the credit of the state.'

69

Two exceptions are made in section 8 to the debt approval process. One
is made to continue to allow certain evidences of indebtedness to be "issued
to finance a project if the debt is authorized by law and is payable solely
165. CAL. CoNsT. art. XVI, §§ 1, 1.5, 2.
166. See CRC: TeXr 149-51; COMM. ON FINANCE 31; PROCEEDINGS 863-76 (Mar.

25, 1974).
167. CRC: TEXT 150.
168. PROCEEDINGS 863-76 (Mar. 25, 1974).
169. The difference may be as great as 1%. Assuming only a difference of .5%,
the savings on level debt service bonds with a term of 25-30 years would be approximately $900,000 on a principal of $10 million.
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from revenues generated by the project to be financed." The exception was
intended to be a narrow one, permitting only projects such as a dormitory
or other undertaking which is entirely self-sufficient. The second exception
is made for state agencies or institutions with less than statewide jurisdiction.
Some governmental entities such as multi-county river authorities are considered state agencies although they have limited geographical jurisdiction.
Section 8 does not include the debt of such agencies within the definition
of "state debt" and as a result the prescribed debt approval process does not
apply. Section 10 of proposed Article IX, Local Government contains tax
and debt limitations applicable to these authorities or state agencies of less
than statewide authority.
Article VIII, section 8 is intended to impose a tighter restriction on the
ability of the state to create debt without the approval of the voters of the
state. This approach is contrary to the one suggested by many national authorities who argue that regardless of how restrictive a constitutional provision
may appear, government officials and inventive bond attorneys will discover
a method for circumventing its purpose. 170 The approach also appears contrary to the one prevalent elsewhere in article VHI, in which the majority
of problems identified under the present constitution are left to statutory solution. The difference in approach may reflect a concern that whereas a defective tax law may be repealed or amended by future legislatures, once debt
has been created, it may bind future taxpayers for decades until discharged.
G.

Pay-As-You-Go for State Appropriations

The so-called state "pay-as-you-go" policy is one of the least understood
but most revered aspects of the present Texas Constitution. It is not, as some
believe, a direct control on state borrowing such as the state debt limitation,
but, rather, is a supplementary set of provisions which control the appropriation process. Article VIII, section 9 of the proposed constitution continues
the pay-as-you-go policy without change.
Section 9 provides that "[n]o money may be drawn from the State
Treasury except in accordance with specific appropriations made by law"'11
and that "[n]o appropriation . . . may be made for a period longer than

two years.' 7 2 In relation to "pay-as-you-go," the latter requirement means
that the legislature may not authorize expenditures of the revenues of a subsequent legislature or enter into contracts which irrevocably obligate those
revenues. It does not mean that appropriations must be for the full two
years. Annual budgets or appropriations for even shorter periods are possible.
The heart of "pay-as-you-go," was added to the constitution in 1942173 and
is carried forward in section 9(d) of the proposed constitution. Each appro170. See generally A. HEINS, CONSTITUTIONAL RESTRICTIONS AGAINST STATE DEBT
(1963); Bowmar, The Anachronism Called Debt Limitation, 52 IowA L. REV. 863
(1957); Morris, Evading Debt Limitations with Public Building Authorities: The Costly
Subversion of State Constitutions, 68 YALE L.J. 234 (1958); Comment, The Judicial
Demise of State ConstitutionalDebt Limitations, 56
171. See TEx. CONST. art. VIII, § 6.

172. Id.
173. Id. art. III, § 49(a).

IowA

L. REv. 646 (1971).
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priation bill is required to pass to the Comptroller of Public Accounts before
going on to the Governor. The Comptroller is charged with certifying that
"the amount appropriated is within the estimated revenue for the applicable
fiscal year." An appropriation without the Comptroller's certification is possible only for an "imperative public necessity" and then only if approved by
a four-fifths vote of the membership of each house of the legislature.
The proceedings of the Constitutional Revision Commission and Constitutional Convention indicate a public reluctance to accept any suggestion of deletion or significant modification of any part of the constitutional pay-as-yougo requirements. 1 74 This reluctance may be justified by the recent success
that has been encountered in keeping state appropriations near actual revenues and in avoiding the need for state borrowing to meet deficit spending.
A key to the success has been the accuracy of the Comptroller's estimates
of anticipated revenue. The estimates have generally been within five percent of actual revenues and have been greater than actual revenues only five
times in the past thirty years.
H. Limitations on the Use of Public Money and Credit
There are three general limitations on -the use of public money and credit
in the proposed constitution. Two appear in article VIII, section 10, which
provides that "[p]ublic funds and public credit may be used only for public
purposes" and that "[n]o public funds or public credit may be used to influence the election of a public officer." The third limitation is in section 9(a),
which prohibits any law from appropriating money from the state treasury
for a purpose not previously authorized by law.
In response to the corruption and misuse of public funds that preceded
the 1875 Constitutional Convention, the delegates to that convention included in the constitution nine separate sections prohibiting the use of public
money or credit for private or local purposes. 175 Except for one which was
deleted in 1969,176 all of the sections remain in the present constitution. The
multiplicity of sections, somewhat ambiguous and inconsistent wording of
each, and the irregular legal interpretations provided by courts and Attorneys
General over the past century have created uncertainty as to the nature of
the rule applicable to the use of public funds. This uncertainty has been
suggested as the cause, 177 either directly or indirectly, of many amendments
to the present constitution to authorize uses such as workmen's compensation,' 7 8 retirement and pension programs for public employees, 79 state wel174. See CRC: TExT 151-52; CoMM. ON FINANCE 32-34.
175. One section (TEx. CONST. art. HI, § 48) undertook to list all of the purposes
for which taxes could be levied. Others (id. art. III, § 50, 51, 52) generally prohibited

"grants" or "loans" to "individuals" or "corporations, including municipal." "Extra compensation" was prohibited in id. art. III, H8 44 and 53. Releases of liens on railroads
were prohibited in id. art. III, § 54. Appropriations for "private purposes" were proscribed in id. art. XVI, § 6. Id. art. VIII, § 3 required that "[t]axes shall be levied
and collected by general laws and for public purposes only."
176. Id. art. III, § 48 (1876).
177. CRC: TEXT 152-54.
178. TEx. CONST. art. III, H§ 59, 60, 61.

179. Id. art. XVI, § 67 (adopted Apr. 22, 1975).
XVI, § 67 repealed six sections of the constitution.

The amendment proposing art.
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fare assistance, 180 and payment for persons wrongfully imprisoned.'

81

The

decision to discard the various limitations of the present constitution in favor
of those in sections 9 and 10 of the proposed constitution resulted, at least
182
in part, from a desire to avoid the need for future amendments.
The provision of section 10 limiting the use of public money and public
credit to public purposes originated in the recommendations of the Constitutional Revision Commission,'8 8 where it had a history of controversy. Apparently no one argued that the provisions of the present constitution did not
need revision, but considerable disagreement existed over the form which
such revision would take. Some members of the Commission indicated that
inclusion of only a public purpose limitation would amount to the removal
of any effective constitutional limits on the use of public funds. Others pro-

tested that the constitution should remain silent or should provide that the
term "public purpose" was to be defined by law. They argued that the determination of how public funds should be used was a responsibility of the
legislature or local elected officials and that it was unnecessary and unwise
to allow the courts to make the final determination. Several proponents of
this view finally settled on the use of the word "only" as indicative of a restrictive rather than liberal interpretation of the limitation.184 During the
1974 Constitutional Convention the focus of attention was redirected toward
finding a satisfactory limitation less broad than "public purposes," but none
was found.
The determination of what constitutes a public purpose under the proposed
constitution is likely to vary with -theparticular facts of each proposed project.
However, some guidelines are available from cases in this state and elsewhere.'8 5 Also, the many purposes authorized by provision in the present
constitution but not mentioned in the proposed one were intended to be preserved as permissible uses of public funds.' 88 Statements made during the
Constitutional Convention and the regular session of the 64th Legislature in180. Id. art. III, § 51-a.
181. Id. § 51-c.
182. See CRC: TEXT 152-54.
183. Id. at 152-53.
184. CRC: STATEMENTS 35-36.
185. See generally CRC: TEXT 153-54; Eich, A New Look at the Internal Improvements and Public Purpose Rules, 1970 Wis. L. REV. 1113; Pinsky, State Constitutional
Limitations on Public Industrial Financing: An Historical and Economic Approach,
111 U. PA. L. REv. 265 (1963); Comment, Missouri's Changing Public Purpose Doctrine, 16 ST. Louis U.L.J. 658 (1972); Comment, State Constitutional Provisions Prohibiting the Loaning of Credit to Private Enterprie-A Suggested Analysis, 41 U.
COLO. L. REV. 135 (1969); Comment, The "Public Purpose" of Municipal Financing
for Industrial Development, 70 YALE L.J. 789 (1971); Note, State Constitutional Limitations on a Municipality's Power To Appropriate Funds or Extend Credit to Individuals and Associations, 108 U. PA. L. REV. 95 (1959).

186. Both the Constitutional Revision Commission proposal and the document
adopted on second reading by the Constitutional Convention provided a section which
was intended to preserve existing uses of public funds.

ON FINANCE 35-36.

See CRC: TEXT 153-54; COMM.

The Convention Committee on Style and Drafting suggested that

the provision be dropped into the transition schedule. TEX. CONsT. CONVENTION, REPORT OF COMM. ON STYLE AND DRAFTING, ARTICLE VIII, FINANCE 40-43 (1974). Sub-

sequently, the Committee on Submission and Transition eliminated the proposed provision entirely on the basis that it was unnecessary and could unintentionally impose a
limitation on uses of public money which could be considered public purposes in the future. Id.; see Const. Convention Submission Res. No. 1 (1974).
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dicate an intent that certain other general concepts, such as public purchases
of insurance from mutual companies, tax increment financing, and industrial
revenue bonds, also were within the limits prescribed by section 10.187
The limitation in section 9 that no law may appropriate money for a purpose not previously authorized by law originated in the Constitutional Convention. A similar provision exists in article III, section 44 of the present
constitution. The limitation that no public funds or public credit may be
used to influence the election of a public officer also originated in the Convention, but there is no comparable provision in the present constitution.
I. Overview of Article VIII
If only because of apparent ambiguities, inconsistencies, and conflicts, the
finance provisions of the present Texas Constitution are in need of revision.
Because of amendments over the past one hundred years, some provisions
are in apparent conflict, while others are partially or wholly inoperative.
Others have been present since 1876 without any definitive legal interpretation.
The most significant substantive changes in the proposed article VIII are
with regard to the property tax, the ability of state agencies to create debt,
and the certainty with which state and local government officials can predict
permissible uses of public funds without constitutional amendment. Several
of the changes concerning the property tax are self-enacting and are intended
to impel property tax reform. Others grant new authority to the legislature
to allow better management of the specifics of the tax.
Proposed article VIII continues certain provisions of the present constitution that the members of the Constitutional Revision Commission and delegates to the Constitutional Convention felt had maintained their usefulness,
and discards others, substituting new provisions in response to lessons learned
during the past one hundred years and anticipated future needs. The record
of the Constitutional Revision Commission and Constitutional Convention reflects that the goals of the proposed article were ones of significant change,
but that the methods adopted were moderate.
VI. CONCLUSION
Whatever the outcome of the November 4, 1975, vote on the proposed
constitution, the significance of the effort which made the constitution's submission possible will not be diminished. This Article has merely touched
upon the many provisions which were considered, reconsidered, drafted, and
redrafted by the various citizens, commissions, committees, and legislators
whose efforts led to the final product. These endeavors have resulted in the
presentation of a document which attempts to respond to the many deficiencies of the existing constitution. It was hoped that the careful attention paid
to detail would result in a document which would guide, rather than hinder.
Surely this constitution, if passed, will not alleviate all problems, but at least
187.

PROCEEDINGS

877-78; 885-86 (Mar. 25, 1974).
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it is a step at providing Texas citizens with a flexible directive in nine essential areas. It is a tribute to the democratic system that a number of seemingly disparate groups could work together to establish necessary reforms in
areas ranging from finance to the judiciary. Finally, it must be emphasized
that the changes herein discussed, and many others, are truly significant, for
they stress important goals of more efficient government, fairer taxation,
equal education, and greater flexibility. 'It reflects the view of those who
contributed to it that the entire document is a logical and necessary response
to many of the unfortunate lessons learned under the more restrictive constitution of 1876.

